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NOTES
Congressional Apportionment: The Unproductive
Search for Standards and Remedies
The increasingly complex problems of elucidating congressional
apportionment standards and granting appropriate relief when voting rights have been materially diluted were again brought to the
fore in the recent districting decision of Calkins v. Hare. 1 This federal district court decision is illustrative of the uncertainty caused by
the Supreme Court's opinion in the landmark case of Wesberry v.
Sanders.2 Although Wesberry resolved two previously contested
issues by ruling that congressional apportionment disputes are susceptible of judicial determination3 and by setting a standard of
population equality in delimiting districts, 4 two associated questions
were left unanswered. First, even though Wes berry established that
districts are to be defined in terms of practicable equality, the Court
did not indicate what latitude, if any, would be acceptable.5 Second,
the opinion is void of any suggestions for remedial action to be
applied in those cases where a state's districting scheme is found to
be outside the bounds of practicable equality.
In Calkins, plaintiffs brought an action in a three-judge federal
district court contesting the constitutionality of the 1963 Michigan
congressional apportionment act6 and seeking an injunction restraining state officials from conducting elections pursuant to the challenged
statute. In light of Wesberry, plaintiffs urged that the disparity in
population among the districts was contrary to article I, section 2 of
the Constitution, which provides that members of the House of
Representatives shall be chosen "by the People of the several States."
Data from the 1960 census7 disclosed a ratio of 1.6 to I between the
most populous district with 494,068 persons and the least populous
1. 228 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
2. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). For a comprehensive discussion of the history of congressional
districting cases, see Carpenter, Wesberry v. Sanders: A Case of Oversimplification, 9
VII.I.. L. REv. 415 (1964); Comment, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 98 (1963); Note, 13 AM. U.L.
REv. 200 (1964); Note, 15 MERCER L. REv. 504 (1964).
3. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964). The suit had been dismissed in the
court below, Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962), on the ground
that Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), precluded judicial review of assaults on
congressional districting as involving "political questions." Prior to Wesberry v.
Sanders, considerable doubt existed as to whether Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
the landmark case involving apportionment of state legislatures, was decisive on the
justiciability of questions regarding inequality in congressional districts. Emerson,
Malapportionment and Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64, 69 (1962).
4. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964).
5. "The Court's 'as nearly as is practicable' formula sweeps a host of questions
under the rug. How great a difference between the population of various districts
within a state is tolerable?" Id. at 21 n.4 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
6. Mich. Pub. Act No. 249 Gune 13, 1963).
7. All ratios presented herein are.based on 1960 census figures.
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with 305,984. Although the defendant contended that the voting
population, rather than the total population, of each district was the
relevant comparative statistic, the court considered it clear that Wesberry contemplated use of the total population of each district. 8 On
final hearing, the court unanimously found that the debasement of
voting power in some districts and its enhancement in others was
unconstitutional and, over the dissent of one judge, granted plaintiff's motion for an injunction.9 The decree provided that, pending
enactment of substitute legislation, congressmen from Michigan
shall be nominated and elected from the state at large. 10
It would appear that precise equality in population among congressional districts is not mandatory. 11 However, Calkins reflects the
considerable amount of frustration in the lower courts as they attempt to define permissible inequality. 12 The difficulty arises from
the fact that these tribunals have been left, unassisted by the Supreme
Court, to fabricate a mathematical formula from the meager material of an interdict on "invidious discrimination" 13 and a mandate
that districts must be practicably equal in population. To accomplish
this task, the judiciary has utilized a myriad of comparisons to delineate the amount of disproportion among districts in question. Although the court in Calkins discussed the average divergence from
uniformity and the absolute difference in population between
adjoining districts, it was largely impressed by the magnitude of the
ratio showing the dissimilarity between the most and least inhabited
districts. This latter technique has been utilized in numerous recent
decisions, and it provides a convenient and consistent statistic to
show, by way of empirical analysis, how inconclusive has been the
pattern of the post-Wesberry cases.
B. But see Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. I, 21 n.4
(1964). Pending before the House Committee on the Judiciary is a proposed constitu•
tional amendment providing that Representatives in Congress shall be apportioned
among the states on the basis of registered voters. H.J. Res. 1053, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964).
9. Complete equity in apportionment is obtainable only by some system of proportional representations. See Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical
Quagmire: The Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH, L. REv. 107, 114 n.35 (1962);
Laughlin, Proportional Representation: It Can Cure Our Apportionment Ills, 49
A.B.A.J. 1065 (1963).
10. Calkins v. Hare, 228 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Mich. 1964). The success of this
decree is evidenced by the fact that the Michigan legislature repealed the invalid
provision, Mich. Pub. Act No. 249 Gune 13, 1963), and replaced it with MICH, STAT,
ANN. § 4.22 (1964), effective Aug. 28, 1964.
11. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964); Calkins v. Hare, supra note 10, at
829. Relocation and growth of the population also preclude exact equality of districts.
See Schattschneider, Urbanization and Reapportionment, 72 YALE L.J. 7 (1962).
12. "It may be argued that now there is a clear standard, but the debate as to
what is 'as near as practicable' continues." Calkins v. Hare, supra note 10, at 833
(O'Sullivan, J., dissenting).
13. Invidious discrimination is that which is arbitrary and not reasonably justifiable.
Israel, supra note 9, at 109.
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Wesberry was brought before the Supreme Court on facts showing that the ratio between the largest and smallest districts in Georgia was 3.03 to 1.14 The Court held that this discrepancy represented
an unconstitutional dilution of voting power in the smaller district.115
The only additional "guideline" offered by the Supreme Court to
date is a per curiam affirmation approving a district court decision
in Texas which held that a disparity of 4.4 to I is invidiously discriminatory and unconstitutional. 16 It is manifest that this incongruous differential offered no clue as to how nearly equal districts
must be to comport with the Court's general requirements in
Wesberry.
Thus, the principal case, which found a population dissimilarity
of 1.6 to I to be invalid, and a district court decision in Meeks v.
Anderson,11 following less than a month later, represent the first
significant refinements of the unconstitutional variance found in
Wesberry. In Meeks, it was held that a ratio of 1.44 to I between
the most and least populous districts in Kansas was too large.18 In
emphasizing that only one factor, population, may be taken into
account in apportioning, the language of the court was so strong
that it cast some doubt on the accuracy of previous generalities that
districts do not have to be precisely equal in population.19 The
Supreme Court, however, indicated soon thereafter that, at least as
regards state legislative apportionment, it is a practical impossibility
to arrange districts so that each one has an identical number of residents and that mathematical precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement.20 On the strength of this precedent, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court was of the opinion that a discrepancy of
1.2 to I was not so great as to require a finding of gross disproportion
in representation or invidious discrimination between the respective
voters in the state's two districts.21 The force of this statement is
impaired, however, by the alternative ground offered as dispositive
14. Georgia's fifth congressional district included 823,680 persons compared with
only 272,154 in the ninth district. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
15. Id. at 4. Four days after the decision was rendered, the Georgia General Assembly reapportioned the state's districts which now range in population from 329,738
to 455,575 persons, a ratio of 1.38 to I. Comment, 35 MISS. L.J. 402,416 (1964).
16. Bush v. Martin, 224 F. Supp. 499 (S.D. Tex. 1963), afj'd per curiam, 376 U.S.
222 (1964). The largest district included 951,527 persons compared with only 216,371
in the smallest.
17. 229 F. Supp. 271 (D. Kan. 1964) (decided April 24).
18. The disparity ran from a low oE 373,583 persons in the fifth district to a high
of 539,592 in the first. Id. at 272.
19. E.g., Clark v. Carter, 218 F. Supp. 448, 451 (E.D. Ky. 1963); Thigpen v. Meyers,
211 F. Supp. 826,831 (W.D. Wash. 1962), appeal pending, 376 U.S. 902 (1964); Wisconsin
v. Zimmerman, 209 F. Supp. 183, 187 (W.D. Wis. 1962); Lisco v. McNicbols, 208 F.
Supp. 471, 476 (D. Colo. 1962). See note 11 supra.
20. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
21. Levitt v. Maynard, 202 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1964). The first district included 331,818
persons compared with 275,103 in the second district.
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of the case; the court asserted that even if the apportionment were
thought to be constitutionally defective, it was too near elections to
grant injunctive relief.22 The petition for declaratory judgment was
continued pending legislative action. Thus, it is uncertain how
much weight can be attributed to the court's initial opinion that a
discrepancy of the magnitude of 1.2 to I is not discriminatory. In
addition to the fact that the above results do not represent binding
law outside the respective jurisdictions that produced them, it is
manifest that they have only limited value as precedent enunciating
definite and refined standards for resolving future districting
contests.23
No less important than the establishment of tolerance standards
is the quest for an appropriate solution when an apportionment
scheme is found invalid. From a practical viewpoint, it appears that
positive relief should come from the judiciary. Congressional action
has been ineffective in producing even approximate equality among
districts. In addition, the prospect of affirmative action by the state
legislatures, at least until recently, has been remote.
Congressional abdication in this area· is clearly demonstrated by
history. From 1789 to 1842, a number of states regularly elected their
congressmen at large.24 Thereafter, Congress promulgated certain
guidelines, the general import of which was to promote the district
system, eliminate multiple-member constituencies, and require, at
least pro forma, that the districts not only be reasonably equal in
population but also that they be composed of "contiguous and compact territory." 25 With minor variations, these basic requirements
were re-enacted by Congress every ten years through I 911.26 However,
in 1920, Congress declined to reapportion after the census,27 and
finally, in 1929, the requirements of equality, contiguity, and compactness were intentionally omitted.28 Evolving from this 1929 legis22. New Hampshire primaries are held on the second Tuesday in September.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 56:4. The case was decided July 16, 1964.
23. It is interesting to note that in construing the equal protection clause prior to
Wesberry, the Missouri Supreme Court held that there was no constitutional violation where districts varied from 378,499 to 506,854 persons. This gives a ratio of 1.34
to 1, which is approximately in the middle of the gap between the Meeks and New
Hampshire cases. Preisler v. Reames, 362 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1962).
24. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: .The Role of the States in
the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 543,
550 (1954).
25. In the election of 1842, Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, and New Hampshire
ignored the newly enacted statute, 5 Stat. 491 (1842), which required election of
representatives by districts. Although objection was made as to this impropriety, the
Representatives were seated. 1 HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
§§ 309-10 (1907).
26. For a comprehensive discussion of early districting legislation, see Wechsler,
supra note 24, at 550.
27. Ibid.
28. Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 7 (1932). But see Black, Inequities in Districting
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lation as amended, the present system provides for automatic redistribution of representation among the states after each census in
addition to a procedure for electing Representatives when a state
fails to preseribe new districts following a change in its allotted
delegation.29 With this minor exception, Congress has left the actual
mechanics of the districting system entirely within the states'
discretion.
Only twice has the seating of a member been challenged on
grounds that his district did not reflect the required standard of
equality. 30 No action was taken in either instance, however, because
the matter was considered too delicate.31 There was a similarly uneventful occurrence in 1951 when President Truman, in his message to Congress, outlined certain criteria for apportioning districts. 32 Basically his proposal was to restore the requirement of
practicable population equality among districts, which he defined
to preclude deviations in excess of fifty thousand above or below a
norm of 350 thousand persons per district.
The inability of state legislatures to correct abuses found in
congressional apportionment is apparent from the fact that inequality of representation in those bodies exceeds that found among congressional districts.83 Thus, the rural interests, which are frequently
overrepresented in Congress, enjoy an even larger margin of voting
power in the state legislatures and thereby dominate the very political machinery by which congressional malapportionment could be
cured.84
The judiciary could, of course, perpetuate this dilemma by
declining to act.35 The majority in Calkins, however, was impressed
by the perplexity confronting the complaining voters and viewed
its responsibility as extending beyond affording declaratory judgment; consequently, a decree was issued enjoining election officials
from enforcing the invalid districting statute and calling for elections at large, pending enactment of substitute legislation.86 This
for Congress, 72 YALE L.J. 13, 18·21 (1962), where the author contends that the Court
misconstrued congressional intent.
29. 46 Stat. 26 (1929), as amended, 55 Stat. 761 (1941), 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1958).
30. Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HAR.v. L. REv.
1057, 1093-94 (1958).
31. Id. at 1094.
32. 97 CONG. REc. 114 (1951).
33. See Goldberg, The Statistics of Malapportionment, 72 YALE L.J. 90 (1962).
34. Traditional recognition given to area and other nonpopulation factors has
greatly inflated the relative influence of rural voters as compared to urbanites and
more recently to suburbanites. See Sindler, Baker v. Carr: How to "Sear the Conscience"
of Legislators, 72 YALE L.J. 23 (1962). Potential relief from the rural imbalance now
exists as a result of Supreme Court rulings that both houses of state legislatures must
be apportioned on a population basis. See WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633
(1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964).
35. See Calkins v. Hare, 228 F. Supp. 824, 829 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
36. Id. at 830.
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disposition, although severely censured in some quarters,87 offers
much to recommend it. Concededly, the ordering of an election at
large of a state legislature would violate those state constitutions
which provide that state legislators must be elected by substate
units, 38 in which event either there would be no de jure legislature
or the legitimacy of the legislature would rest solely on a court
decree. 30 However, this same reasoning does not apply to the United
States House of Representatives. Congress would continue to conform to the United States Constitution even though its members
were elected at large from the respective states.40 In addition, the
command to conduct at-large elections may be phrased in simple
terms, and all the inescapable political decisions are confined to the
legislature, which is the traditional forum for such matters. Furthermore, the probability of redistricting is high since the recalcitrants,
presumably a minority interest,41 would incur the greatest proportionate loss in an election at large. Finally, recourse to ordering a
state to elect its entire congressional delegation at large does not rest
on untried ground, having been adopted twice by the United States
Supreme Court42 and once by the Virginia court. 43 In all three
instances, the legislatures responded by reapportioning before the
next election.44
At-large elections appear particularly attractive when compared
to the principal alternatives of inaction or permitting the courts
themselves to frame all the changes necessary in the apportionment
system.45 Most courts have refused to undertake directly the task of
redrawing a state's districts, 46 although this view has not been
adopted with unanimity. 47 Notwithstanding the general merits of
ordering elections at large, however, additional expense and inconvenience to both candidates and voters makes this solution increas37. E.g., Gong v. Bryant, 230 F. Supp. 917 (S.D. Fla. 1964). See Comment, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 264, 266 n.14 (1964).
38. Black, supra note 28, at 15.
39. Ibid.
40. See Alsup v. Mayhall, 208 F. Supp. 713 (S.D. Ala. 1962); White v. Frink, 274
Ala. 49, 145 So. 2d 435 (1962).
41. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
42. Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
43. Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932).
44. Lewis, supra note 30, at 1088. Affirmative action was also achieved by the decree
in Calkins. See note 10 supra.
45. Such an assertion of power by a court would be met with a negative reaction.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter observed, "Surely a Federal District Court could not itself remap the State••.." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 328 (1962) (dissenting opinion). But
see Dixon, Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress: Constitutional
Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REv. 209, 228-30 (1964).
46. E.g., Maryland Citizens Comm. for Fair Congressional Redistricting, Inc. v.
Tawes, 228 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md. 1964); Bush v. Martin, 224 F. Supp. 499 (S.D.
Tex. 1963), afj'd per curiam, 376 U.S. 222 (1964).
47. E.g., Moss v. Burkhart, 220 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Okla. 1963), afj'd sub nom.,
Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964); Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala.
1962), aff'd sub nom., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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ingly less desirable as the election date approaches. 48 In a recent
Supreme Court decision, 49 it was suggested that a court should at
least consider the proximity of an approaching election and the
mechanics of state election laws before awarding immediate relief.
Another cause of dilatory judicial response is the belief that the
legislature will eradicate the problem after it is informed of the
inequity.50 Unfortunately, this deference has often proved too optimistic, as some states have failed to respond even after repeated
admonitions from the courts. 51
The enormity of the existing problem is apparent from the observation of Mr. Justice Harlan that, under one potentially acceptable formulation, all but thirty-seven congressional districts are
outside the requirement of practicable equality.52 In addition, population projections indicate that the current disproportion will increase as people continue to concentrate in urban and suburban
complexes.53 Therefore, it can be seen from both major remaining
deficiencies in the judicial attempt to promote reapportionmentuncertain standards and inadequate remedies-that there is an
urgent need for Congress to exercise its general supervisory power
over the elections of its members. Failure to act cannot be justified
on grounds of absence of authority. The drafters of the Constitution
anticipated the possibility of malapportionment54 and provided federal power to overcome it.55 Recent pragmatic experience with the
application of this doctrine clearly demonstrates that effective implementation depends upon Congress providing a legislative vehicle by
which transgressions may be uniformly detected and alleviated.56
48. See, e.g., Gong v. Bryant, 230 F. Supp. 917 (S.D. Fla. 1964); Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 209 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Wis. 1962); White v. Anderson, 394 P .2d 333 (Colo. 1964);
Guntert v. Richardson, 394 P .2d 444 (Hawaii 1964).
49. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964).
50. E.g., Meeks v. Anderson, 229 F. Supp. 271 (D. Kan. 1964); Levitt v. Maynard,
202 A.2d 478 (N.H. 1964).
51. See Thigpen v. Meyers, 231 F. Supp. 938 (W.D. Wash. 1964); Maryland Citizens
Comm. for Fair Congressional Redistricting, Inc. v. Tawes, 228 F. Supp. 956 (D. Md.
1964).
52. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 21 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
53. See Schattschneider, supra note 11.
54. Lewis, supra note 30, at 1072.
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing Senators ..•."
56. Subsequent to the Wesberry decision, on February 17, 1964, several measures
were brought before the House of Representatives: H.R. 11650, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964)°, providing that districts shall not vary more than 20% from the average of all
the districts in the state; H.R. 11844, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), providing that no
district shall vary more than 15% from the average of all the districts in the state;
H.R. 12309, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), providing for a mid-decade census in 1965 to
reapportion the House.

